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Abstract In Rawls’ (A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971)
influential social contract approach to distributive justice, the fair income distribution
is the one that an individual would choose behind a veil of ignorance. Harsanyi (J Polit
Econ 61:434–435, 1953, J Polit Econ 63:309–332, 1955, Am Polit Sci Rev 69:594–
606, 1975) treated this situation as a decision under risk and arrived at utilitarianism
using expected utility theory. This paper investigates the implications of applying
cumulative prospect theory instead, which better describes behavior under risk. I find
that the specific type of inequality in bottom-heavy right-skewed income distributions,
which includes the log-normal income distribution, could be perceived as desirable.
This optimal inequality result contrasts the implications of other social welfare criteria.
Keywords Veil of ignorance · Prospect theory · Social welfare function · Income
inequality
1 Introduction
How to distribute income fairly is a question that has been discussed across different
disciplines of social science and philosophy. Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1975) and Rawls
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(1971) offered two of the most influential theories of distributive justice, both using
the popular social contract approach. A central idea is that the normative question can
be transformed to the descriptive question of what income distribution an individual
would choose in a hypothetical original position before knowing her identity in the
society.1 Behind such a veil of ignorance, the decision maker becomes an impartial
observer, internalizing the interests of each member of the society appropriately, as
she has to account for potentially becoming each of them. Under the impartiality con-
straint which seems to be a prerequisite for justice, social preferences could be derived
from individual preferences. Whereas Rawls’ argued that the impartial observer would
choose distributions according to the maximin principle, Harsanyi favored utilitarian-
ism.
There are, however, many difficulties with deriving a theory of justice using the
original position. Some issues concern what assumptions to make about the impartial
observer’s preferences (e.g., for income and risk) and the exact nature of the decision
problem (e.g., whether probabilities of possible income levels are known).2 Motivating
the exact framing of the original position seems to be a normative task in itself that could
be as difficult as the question of fair income distribution. There are also more general
methodological concerns such as whether the social contract approach appropriately
captures impartiality and whether justice requires more than impartiality.3
While these are interesting issues that have received a lot of attention, there is
also a literature that stays agnostic about them and that focuses on answering the
descriptive question about the desired outcome behind the veil of ignorance by asking
individuals in surveys (e.g, Frohlich et al. 1987; Bosmans and Schokkaert 2004; Herne
and Suojanen 2004; Johansson-Stenman et al. 2002; Traub et al. 2005; Amiel et al.
2009). The conclusions of these studies are not clear-cut and depend crucially on
the framing of the original position.4 A general pattern is that both the maximin and
utilitarian social welfare functions perform poorly in explaining the survey responses.
A parsimonious way to characterize the original position is to think of income
distributions as lotteries of birth because the impartial observer randomly becomes
somebody in her chosen distribution.5 Harsanyi embraced the lottery interpretation
of the original position and used von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) theory of
1 The original position therefore seems to violate Hume’s law (1739) asserting that normative conclusions
cannot follow from descriptive premises.
2 Both Rawls and Harsanyi argued that some restrictions should be made on the impartial observer and the
decision problem, although they did not agree about the restrictions.
3 For instance, Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2008) argued that justice requires prioritarianism and they
show that the veil of ignorance is not compatible with prioritarianism when different individuals have
different preferences.
4 Among other things, the conclusions depend on factors such as whether the scenario is about risk or
uncertainty, whether the respondents should consider themselves to be external observers or involved in the
realized distributions, the thickness of the veil, individual background characteristics, and the exact rules
of negotiation in the case of groups agreeing on a principle of justice.
5 Randomness is sometimes perceived to be unfair ex post because it is beyond individuals’ control.
However, because the impartial observer chooses and accepts the randomness ex ante, it makes the chosen
income distribution impartial and arguably fair.
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decision under risk applying expected utility theory to the problem.6 Since Harsanyi’s
seminal work, there is plenty of new empirical evidence that expected utility theory
provides a poor description of individual behavior under risk.7 To cope with the defi-
ciencies of expected utility theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect
theory and later modified it to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman
1992). There are, by now, many empirical studies in support of these theories.8 In
this paper, I explore the consequences of applying the cumulative version of prospect
theory9 given the lottery interpretation of the original position. The result represents
an impartially perceived social preference for income distributions based on realistic
and empirically verified individual human preferences.10
The exercise corresponds to asking individuals about their preferences in a rudi-
mental original position without imposing normative concerns, but without involving
the complications of actually surveying individuals. Realistic prospect-theory type of
human risk preferences have been used before for individual welfare evaluations by
Günther and Maier (2008) and Jänttietal et al (2014). While they evaluated the effects
of real income changes, I evaluate static hypothetical distributions. Furthermore, the
original position intends to connect individual choice to social welfare.
I study the problem of distributing a fixed amount of income in a population once.
The individual preference for risk-free income is assumed to have the same functional
form across individuals.11 It is a decision under risk because the frequencies of different
income levels are known. Production and efficiency concerns are ignored. I start out
by investigating the simplest two-level income distribution for analytical tractability
and to pin down the intuition before moving on to multi-level income distributions
using numerical methods. Unlike original prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory
that I use can handle such distributions in an uncontroversial way.12 Furthermore,
nobody has successfully developed such a foundation for original prospect theory
which also violates stochastic dominance. It may therefore be argued that a rational
individual should not follow original prospect theory. These deficiencies are solved
with cumulative prospect theory. When referring to prospect theory, I will typically
refer to its cumulative version.
6 To be precise, Harsanyi used von Neuman–Morgernstern individual preferences and the principle of
insufficient reasons to weight the outcomes, which results in the expected utility formula.
7 See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979), Hershey and Schoemaker
(1980), Payne et al. (1981), Wehrung (1989), Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Camerer and Ho (1994), and
Wu and Gonzalez (1996).
8 See Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and the references in footnote 7.
9 Empirically, some data fits original prospect theory better (e.g., Camerer and Ho 1994), while other data
fits cumulative prospect theory better (e.g., Fennema and Wakker 1997).
10 This contrasts Rawls impartial observer who is stripped of most human preferences, e.g., risk preferences,
as Rawls argued that the impartial observer should disregard the frequencies of different income levels.
11 A major modern discussion on the veil of ignorance concerns how to deal with heterogeneous preferences
for risk-free income (see, e.g., Karni 1998; Mongin 2001). The simple setting here abstracts from issues of
interpersonal comparability of preferences.
12 Wakker and Tversky (1993) provided a straightforward extension of cumulative prospect theory for
continuous distributions. Rieger and Wang (2008) suggested a way to extend original prospect theory to
handle multi-outcome and continuous distributions that Kothiyal et al. (2011) find “unsatisfactory”.
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In my simple setting, social welfare functions in the previous literature all favor
complete equality. These criteria are typically based on diminishing marginal utility,
direct positional concerns for the lower end of income distributions, or are directly
inversely related to income inequality.13
As shown by Wakker and Tversky (1993), the preference foundation of prospect
theory replaces the independence assumption of expected utility theory with reference
and positional dependence (often called sign and rank dependence). Prospect theory
reference dependence has three distinguishing features: First, income carries utility
relative to a reference level. Second, not only gains but also losses exhibit decreas-
ing marginal sensitivity. Third, losses carry more disutility than gains carry utility.
Prospect theory positional dependence is implemented through non-linear probability
weights where probabilities of the relatively largest gains and losses are overweighted
compared to probabilities of other gains and losses.
While reference and positional dependence are realistic psychological features of
human decision utility, it is unclear whether such relative comparisons should enter
welfare evaluations. At an individual level, this type of behavioral patterns may some-
times seem irrational if the reference point can be manipulated or if it is unstable
over time. Nevertheless, there is evidence that experienced well-being also depend on
relative comparisons (Kahneman et al. 1997).14 Furthermore, the happiness research
literature provides evidence that income relative to some measure of average income in
a country matters for expressed well-being (see, e.g., Easterlin 1974; Frey and Stutzer
2002). Excluding these elements of satisfaction from individual welfare seems highly
paternalistic. The individual preference foundation translates into a social preference
foundation in the original position, where individual relative comparisons translate
into social relative comparisons.
An issue in the original position concerns how to choose the reference income. I first
explore the effects of using the mean income as the reference income. This is the income
level all individuals would have in the even income distribution with complete equality
which is the distribution favored by other approaches to justice such as egalitarianism
and prioritarianism. The mean-income reference setting also corresponds to a thought
experiment where individuals in a complete equality world evaluate the attractiveness
of lottery-based income redistribution. Another interpretation is that complete equality
is the default to be implemented if the impartial observer does not choose another
distribution.
As an alternative, I also develop and use “representative aggregation of reference
incomes” which takes the mean of the social welfare evaluations of each of the individ-
uals in the realized income distribution using the realized income of each individual as
her reference income. With this method, we do not need to ask individuals to assume
a hypothetical counterfactual reference income and we come even closer to captur-
13 They include, besides the utilitarian and maximin social welfare functions, e.g., the Cobb–Douglas
social welfare function, the quadratic social welfare function (Epstein and Segal 1992), Atkinson’s social
welfare function (Atkinson 1970), Gini, entropy, and Boulding’s principle (Boulding 1962). Of course,
when production is introduced into the problem, inequality may be tolerated because there is usually an
efficiency-equity trade-off.
14 Bernheim and Rangel (2009) proposed an approach to connect individual choice based on decision
utility, experienced utility, or remembered utility with individual welfare.
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ing realistic individual preferences. This setting corresponds to a thought experiment
where we have individuals in realized distributions evaluate the attractiveness of redis-
tributing income in lotteries where everybody has the same probability of switching
income position with everybody else. The best society is the one with the best impartial
self-evaluations.
A prospect theory impartial observer has two reasons to prefer an uneven income
distribution. First, incurring small losses with a high probability to afford large gains
with a low probability could be attractive because the large gains are overweighted.
Second, incurring large losses with a low probability to afford small gains with a
high probability could be attractive because the large losses have low marginal disu-
tility. In a two-level income world, this leads to two possible types of optimal uneven
income distributions.15 The first type is a bottom-heavy right-skewed superstar distri-
bution where few individuals have very high income and many individuals have low
income. The second type is a top-heavy left-skewed scapegoat distribution where few
individuals have very low income and many individuals have high income.
Whether inequality is perceived as desirable depends on the exact parameterization
of prospect theory. I show that the superstar distribution is optimal under some assump-
tions. Furthermore, the superstar type of inequality is more desirable than complete
equality when using a reasonably chosen prospect theory parameterization for two-
level income distributions and log-normal income distributions which many countries
have (Gibrat 1931; Aitchison and Brown 1957; Battistin et al. 2007). The intuition is
that these income distributions resemble fair odds lotteries that people do buy. Such
distributions contain the American dream with an ex ante opportunity to become a
superstar creating a strong psychological possibility effect.
From a normative standpoint, the evaluation of optimal inequality depends on
whether we should give any weight to (dis)satisfaction derived from social compar-
isons between individuals in a society. It also depends on whether the type of procedural
justice in the original position appropriately embodies impartiality and whether impar-
tiality has intrinsic value. In this regard, it may be argued that optimal inequality is an
unpleasant and unacceptable result that indicates that the original position needs to be
modified or rejected.
Our results are, however, also descriptively interesting. They imply that if complete
equality is imposed at a certain point in time (let us say, for fairness reasons), such a
distribution would not prevail over time if we allow individuals to redistribute income
by participating in lotteries. Instead, they would voluntarily and jointly opt for the
optimal-inequality type of distribution.
The next section presents the model used. Section 3 presents the income distribu-
tions investigated. Section 4 reports some analytical results. Section 5 reports some
numerical results. The final section concludes and further discusses the implications
of the results.
15 To avoid overcomplicating phrasing, I sometimes write that an income distribution is optimal, desirable,




The problem at hand concerns how to evaluate different income distributions once. It
is a purely static problem and income can be thought of as life-time income, resources,
endowment, wealth, or consumption goods. Assume that each risk-free income level x
carries a (decision) utility for individuals according to the (basic) utility function u (x).
Individuals are identical and they all have the same utility function. By normalizing
the population to one, the frequencies in the income distribution can be interpreted as
population shares p (x).
The original position transforms society’s choice of the optimal income distribu-
tion into an individual impartial observer’s choice of the optimal lottery interpreting
the frequencies described by the function p (.) as probabilities of different lottery
outcomes. The lottery interpretation is attractive because it forces the social welfare
evaluation to account for the outcome of each individual in the income distribution,
in the same manner as an individual’s preference evaluation of a lottery where she
accounts for each of the different lottery outcomes she could end up with.
Choice patterns for lottery distributions have been extensively studied theoretically
and empirically before. It is, therefore, possible to apply a calibrated model of decision
under risk that relies on the insights of this literature to investigate the problem without
the need to ask individuals about their hypothetical preferences in the original position.
This circumvents the issues of how to appropriately frame the original position to
remove normative elements and to obtain truthful answers of behavior in a hypothetical
scenario.
I apply a general model for evaluation of income and lottery distributions that
encompasses expected utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944) and cumu-
lative prospect theory. I work with the cumulative version of prospect theory (Tversky
and Kahneman 1992) because it can handle multi-level income distributions.16 Fur-
thermore, it is generally believed to be theoretically sounder because it has a preference
foundation (Wakker and Tversky 1993) and does not violate stochastic dominance.
The impartial observer attaches weights w (x; p (.)) to each income level in a way
that may depend on the entire income distribution. We are interested in evaluating
income distributions with a fixed total and mean income xm. Any income distribution
can be obtained by starting out from an even income distribution where everyone has
income xm and then transferring income from some individuals to others. Any uneven
income distribution corresponds to a mean-preserving spread of the even income
distribution.
The optimal income distribution is then the distribution that maximizes the weighted
average of the utility attached to each income level according to:
max
p(.)
U (p (.)) =
∑
x
w (x; p (.)) u (x)
16 For two-outcome prospects with both a gain and a loss, cumulative prospect theory collapses to original
prospect theory. Cumulative prospect theory is typically used in empirical applications involving multi-
outcome prospects (e.g., Barberis and Huang 2008; Barberis and Xiong 2009 provide applications on stock
market returns).
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p (x) = 1 and
∑
x
p (x) x = xm. (1)
From the society’s perspective, the objective function U represents the social welfare
of an income distribution. From the impartial observer’s perspective, U represents the
perceived decision utility of a lottery distribution.
The criterion in Eq. (1) can be further specified by choosing functional forms for
u (.) and w (.). For an expected utility impartial observer, the utility function is concave
(u′′ (x) < 0), which reflects risk aversion. Furthermore, the probability weight is linear
in the probability (w = p (x)). Such a decision utility leads to the utilitarian social
welfare function. These features are implied by the independence axiom where income
and associated probabilities add welfare without depending on the rest of the income
distribution.
For a prospect theory impartial observer, the utility function depends on the
reference income x0. It is concave for gains (u′′ (x > x0) < 0) and convex for
losses (u′′ (x < x0) > 0). Furthermore, it exhibits loss aversion (u′ (x0 + a) <
u′ (x0 − a) , a > 0). Reference dependence reflects the fact that people evaluate
income relative to an anchoring point. Diminishing sensitivity reflects the fact that
accumulated losses are perceived as better than many small losses.
The probability weights are position dependent and depend on the entire income
distribution. It is typically defined trough the concept of capacities (Choquet 1955)
which is a cumulative weighting function W (p). Following Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), we can express the probability weights according to:
w (x; p (.)) =
{
W (p (xi ≥ x)) − W (p (xi > x)) x ≥ x0
W (p (xi ≤ x)) − W (p (xi < x)) x < x0, (2)
where subindex i indexes income levels. The probability weighting function con-
tains two pieces and may be discontinuous at the reference income. The cumulative






1−W ((1−p)r) , p, q ∈ (0, 1)
)
. These properties result in the
overweighting of probabilities of the relatively largest gains and losses and the under-
weighting of probabilities of other gains and losses. Because large gains and losses
usually occur with low probabilities in applications, this is often interpreted as the
overweighting of low probabilities and the underweighting of high probabilities.17
Prospect theory weights embody an indirect positional dependence. Features of
the income distribution contribute indirectly to social welfare through the welfare
contribution of each income level. This dependence reflects that probabilities of income
levels tend to be categorized as impossible, possible, probable, and certain.
17 In most applications, such as the ones here, overweighting can be expressed in terms of the income level
(Wakker and Tversky 1993) or in terms of the probability of the income level (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
In cases where the two descriptions differ, the former description is more accurate for cumulative prospect
theory. Original prospect theory, which uses the latter description, faces issues with potential violation of






























0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Cumulative probability
EU PT
Fig. 1 Individual utility and probability weighting functions
Altogether, prospect theory produces a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk aver-
sion for small gains and large losses and risk seeking for large gains and small
losses. The theory can explain, e.g., why some people buy both lottery tickets and
insurance.
Given these properties, the utility and probability weighting functions can be param-
eterized in different ways. In the numerical exercises, I use the standard constant
relative risk-aversion (CRRA) utility function. The utility functions for expected util-
ity theory (EU) and prospect theory (PT) are:
uEU (x) = x˜αEU − x¯, x˜EU = x, x¯ = xα0 , (3)
uPT (x) =
{
x˜αPT − x¯, x ≥ x0−λ [x˜αPT − x¯
]
x < x0
, x˜PT = |x − x0| + x0, x¯ = xα0 , (4)
where 0 < α < 1, and λ > 1. Augmenting the standard functions by x¯ nor-
malizes utility to zero at the reference income and restricts the utility of income
levels above the reference income to be the same in expected utility theory and
prospect theory. x˜EU and x˜PT accounts reference independence and dependence,
respectively.
In Eq. (3), risk aversion decreases when α increases. In Eq. (4), marginal sensitivity
of gains and losses increases when α increases. λ measures loss aversion. Marginal
utility is also discontinuous at the reference point. The utility functions in Eqs. (3) and
(4) are illustrated in the left panel of Fig. 1 in which x0 is normalized to one.
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For the cumulative weighting function, I use the following commonly used param-
eterizations in the numerical exercises:
wEU (x) = wEU (p (x)) = WEU (p) = p (x) , (5)
wPT (x; p (.)) : WPT (p) = p
γ
(pγ + (1 − p)γ )1/γ . (6)
Equation (5) just shows that with a linear cumulative weighting function, we obtain
the linear expected utility probability weighting function. γ reflects the degree of
overweighting and collapses to linear weights when γ = 1.
The probability weighting functions described by Eqs. (2), (5) and (6) are illustrated
in the right panel of Fig. 1, where I plot the resulting cumulative weight against the
cumulative probability with income levels ranked in ascending order. The derivatives
of the graphs provide the weight given to each income level depending on its position
in the distribution. For prospect theory, we plot the special case with a win probability
of 50%.
Neilson and Stowe (2002) showed that given the functional form, only high values
of α (> 0.5) can accommodate some gambling on unlikely gains. Furthermore, given
high values of α, only low values of γ (< 0.3) can accommodate the Allais para-
dox. I set α = 0.5 and γ = 0.3 which can accommodate both empirically observed
phenomenon.18 Most result patterns are insensitive to quite large variations of the
two parameters. In particular, all patterns are preserved when increasing α and when
decreasing γ . I set λ = 2.25 like estimated in Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
It could be argued from the point of view of individual well-being that risk aversion
toward lotteries is rational because marginal income is typically spent on basic goods
fulfilling essential needs at low income levels. Furthermore, equal concern of each
potential future self seems to support the independence axiom. This is the type of
argument used to motivate expected utility theory as a normative theory. On the other
hand, reference points could be manipulated and could be unstable over time. Never-
theless, individual satisfaction including experienced and expressed well-being does
depend on relative comparisons and excluding such satisfaction from individual wel-
fare seems highly paternalistic. The individual preference foundation translates into a
social preference foundation in the original position. Individual relative comparisons
translate into social relative comparisons. The welfare of an individual depends on its
position in the income distribution and the reference position.
There is, however, no dynamic aspect in the original position, alleviating unstable
reference points over time. However, a reference income needs to be chosen. I explore
the effects of using the mean income in the population as the reference income. This
is also the income everyone has under complete equality, which is the optimal income
distribution when using other social welfare criteria. However, it could be criticized
18 In the studies by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Camerer and Ho (1994), and Wu and Gonzalez (1996),
varies between 0.32 and 0.88, and varies between 0.56 and 0.74. As Neilson and Stowe (2002) showed,
the combinations of parameter values in these studies cannot account for both the mentioned phenomenon
at the same time, unlike the intended design of prospect theory in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). The
alternative parameterization in Prelec (1998) suffers from the same issues.
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for being a choice that already embodies a normative statement—that some represen-
tative individual is the standard. Besides also elaborating with the median income as
the reference income, I suggest and use a procedure to overcome the arbitrariness in
choosing a specific reference income. The procedure takes the mean of the (hypothet-
ical) social welfare evaluations (behind the veil of ignorance) of all individuals in the
realized distribution, using the realized income of each individual as her reference
income. This is formally defined in Definition 1.
Definition 1 Representative aggregation of reference incomes:
U (p (.)) =
∑
x0
p (x0) U (p (.) |x0). (7)
U (p (.) |x0) is the objective function of an individual behind the veil of ignorance
calculated using Eq. (1), given her reference income x0. We now take the expecta-
tion over a distribution of reference incomes, using the actual distribution p (.). This
corresponds to letting each individual in the evaluated income distribution evaluat-
ing the income distribution behind the veil of ignorance given her ex post realized
reference income, and then averaging over all individuals’ evaluations. The proce-
dure is representative by giving each individual’s evaluation the same weight in the
aggregation.
In the same way as expected utility theory is egalitarian in giving each individ-
ual’s utility the same weight, my representative aggregation is egalitarian in giving
each individual’s impartial perception of the income distribution the same weight.
This impartial perception requires of each individual to internalize the utility of other
individuals. In this internalization, the individual is not hypothetically stripped of
her reference income and satisfaction derived from social comparisons. We therefore
come even closer to capturing realistic individual preferences. The averaging can be
normatively motivated using the same independence argument as used in expected
utility theory.19
Using representative aggregation of reference incomes with a prospect theory utility
function transforms the decision problem in Eq. (1) to:
max
p(.)





p (x0) w (x; p (.) |x0) u (x |x0) . (8)
Note that for an expected utility impartial observer, the reference income does not
affect the social welfare evaluation.
3 Income distributions
To explore the effects of different components of prospect theory and to illustrate the
basic intuition, I start with the simplest problem, where income can take two different
19 It is possible to argue that the weight given to different welfare evaluations should not be equal.
However, whereas human satisfaction depends on social comparisons of income, there is no evidence that
human satisfaction depends on social comparisons of evaluations.
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Fig. 2 Two-level and multi-level income distributions with a mean income of one
levels. Because of the revenue neutrality constraint, there are three possible types
of income distributions. One type of income distribution is the bottom-heavy right-
skewed distribution where a majority of individuals have less than the mean income
and a minority of individuals have much more than the mean income. I call this type of
distribution “the superstar distribution”. Ex ante, before its realization, it embodies the
American dream providing the impartial observer the opportunity to take a fair-odds
long-shot gamble on becoming a superstar.
Another type of distribution is the top-heavy left-skewed distribution where a minor-
ity of individuals have much less than the mean income and a majority of individuals
have more than the mean income. I call this type of distribution “the scapegoat distri-
bution”. Ex ante, it provides the impartial observer the possibility to take a fair-odds
“safe bet” on not becoming the scapegoat. The two different types of distributions are
displayed in the left panel of Fig. 2 where mean income is normalized to one. Further-
more, there is also the type of distribution where half of the individuals have less than
the mean income and half of the individuals have more than the mean income.
In the numerical section, I also investigate some multi-level discrete approximations
of continuous income distributions. I investigate some symmetric income distributions
and some asymmetric superstar distributions because the two-level analysis will indi-
cate that superstar distributions are particularly promising. The investigated income
distributions include the uniform, normal, triangular, and log-normal income distribu-
tions. They are displayed in the right panel of Fig. 2. The log-normal distribution is of
particular interest because the income distributions of most countries have this shape
(Gibrat 1931; Aitchison and Brown 1957; Battistin et al. 2007).
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The impartial observer can, of course, choose from any positive income distribution
that preserves the mean and not only the income distributions investigated here. The
optimal income distribution may be one that is not investigated here. Because of the
difficulties with functional form and parameterization discussed in the last section, the
exact welfare numbers (certainty equivalents in the numerical exercises) should not
be taken too seriously.
For two-level income distributions, when the mean income in the population is the
reference income, the decision problem in Eq. (1) is reduced to:20
max
xg,pg
w(pg)u(xm + xg) + w(1 − pg)u
(
xm − pg1 − pg xg
)
. (9)
xg is the size of the gains relative to the reference income x0 = xm, pg is the gain
probability, xg ≥ 0, and w(xg, p(.)) = w(pg) = W (pg). With a finite population,
0 < pg < pg < 1 − pg < 1. pg is the lower bound corresponding to one individual
with more than the mean income. For some results, I assume that the number of
individuals in the population is large and that pg is close to zero.
When using representative aggregation of reference incomes, the decision problem













Let us start with the expected utility optimum for two-level income distributions. The
decision problem is formulated in Eq. (9). Because of diminishing marginal utility,
spread cannot be desirable. This classical equality result is stated in Proposition 1. All
proofs are presented in the Appendix. The equality solution provides a utility of zero.
The result can be extended to the case allowing for continuous income distributions for
concave utility functions. See, e.g., Mas-Collel et al. (1995), who show that concavity
implies preferences against mean-preserving spreads.
Proposition 1 For two-level income distributions, complete equality is optimal when
using expected utility theory, i.e., x∗g = 0.
The overweighting of probabilities of the relatively largest gains in prospect theory
creates a possibility for an uneven income distribution to be optimal by accumulating
20 For the two-level case the constraint in Eq. (1) becomes pgxg + pιxι = 0, where l indexes the loss
state. Making use of pι = (1 − pg) gives xι = −pgxg/(1 − pg) leading to the argument in u(.) for the
loss state in Eq. (9).
21 The first term represents (1 − pg) individuals with the low income reference-level that see a pg chance,
given the weight w(pg), of getting (xg + xm) − (xm + xι) = xg/(1 − pg) in addition their reference level,
after making use of the in footnote 20. The second term is similarly derived.
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gains (incomes above the mean income) among a few individuals at the expense of
smaller losses (incomes below the mean income) for a larger number of individuals.
With a concave utility function, such an outcome is optimal, both when the mean
income is the reference income and when using representative aggregation of reference
incomes, according to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 For two-level income distributions, when using a prospect theory prob-
ability weighting function and a weakly concave utility function, we have that:




xm and p∗g < 0.5 is optimal. The





1 − pg , (11)
which is implied by the prospect theory probability weighting function.





p∗g < 0.5 is optimal.
The superstar distribution in Proposition 2a contains at least one superstar and at most
half the population as superstars, with much more than the mean income, supported
by all other individuals having less than the mean income. The results depend on
the parameterization. The upper bound on gains occurs where the individuals with
less than the mean income have no income, and the superstars have all income. With
a linear utility function, no factor works against spread, and the optimal income of
superstars approach its upper bound.
The diminishing marginal sensitivity in losses in prospect theory creates another
possibility for an uneven income distribution to be optimal by accumulating losses
among a few individuals to allow smaller gains for a larger number of individuals. With
a linear probability weighting function, such an outcome could be optimal when the
mean income is the reference income, but not when using representative aggregation
of reference incomes, according to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For two-level income distributions, when using a prospect theory utility
function and a linear probability weighting function, we have that:
(a) When the mean income is the reference income, either of the following two con-























> pg [uPT (xm) − uPT (0)] . (13)
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(b) If x is unconstrained and pg → 0+ in (a), the following weaker condition is
sufficient for a scapegoat distribution: there is an x such that u′PT (x > xm) >
limz→−∞u′PT (z).
(c) Complete equality is optimal when applying representative aggregation of refer-
ence incomes.
The scapegoat distribution in Proposition 3a contains one individual scapegoat with
much less than the mean income, sacrificed so that all other individuals can have
more than the mean income. Whether such a distribution is optimal depends on the
parameterization. The first sufficient condition in Eq. (12) requires the marginal utility
of gains at the mean income to be larger than the marginal disutility of losses that
are larger than the gains at the mean income. Whether the condition holds depends
on three factors. Loss aversion works against the condition because it leads to the
marginal utility being greater for losses of the same size as gains. The number of
individuals and the degree of diminishing sensitivity in losses work in favor of the
condition because the losses are larger than the gains and because marginal disutility
decreases with losses.
The second sufficient condition in Eq. (13) requires that the gain utility of a small
gain weighted by the number of individuals getting the gain is greater than the loss
utility of one individual losing all her income. Again, loss aversion works against the
condition, whereas diminishing sensitivity in losses works in favor of it. The purpose
of having this second condition is to show that we do not require a condition involving
the marginal utility at the mean income.
When allowing for income to be unconstrained, the condition required for a scape-
goat distribution to be optimal becomes weaker in Proposition 3b. We then only require
the marginal disutility at the (possibly hypothetical) worst-off loss to be small enough
in comparison with the marginal utility at an arbitrary gain. This is fulfilled, e.g., if the
marginal disutility of losses converges to zero or if the marginal utility of gains is infi-
nite for the first dollar, an Inada condition often assumed on utility functions. When
interpreting the input in the utility function as income or resources, the lower zero
bound is natural. If the amount of resources to distribute is large, the lower constraint
may, however, be relatively very low, and the condition assuming unboundedness may
be a good approximation. A lower bound greater than zero may be desirable for other
reasons, e.g., if there are basic goods without which individuals experience extreme
disutility.22
The optimization problem becomes much more complicated when combining
prospect theory utility and probability weighting functions. In general, the solution
depends on the exact parameterization of the functions. In Proposition 4, I state two
sufficient conditions for a superstar distribution to increase social welfare compared
to complete equality.
22 Prospect theory has not been empirically tested in situations involving extremely low income levels
where individuals cannot afford basic goods. The acceptability of the conclusion of one suffering individual
to let the others thrive (a tiny bit more) may be considered to be normatively unacceptable. It would be
simple to reframe our decision problem as distributing a fixed amount of non-basic goods.
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Proposition 4 For two-level income distributions, when using prospect theory utility
and probability weighting functions, we have that:
(a) When the mean income is the reference income or when using representative
aggregation of reference incomes,
lim
pg→0+
w(pg) > 0 (14)
and pg → 0+ are sufficient for a superstar distribution with x∗g > 0 and
p∗g → pg to be preferred to complete equality, i.e., there is an xg such that
UPT(xg > 0, pg → pg) > 0 = UPT(xg = 0).
(b) When using representative aggregation of reference incomes, the following con-








The superstar distributions in Proposition 4a and 4b are not necessarily the optimal
income distribution, but they are preferred to complete equality. Because w (p) = 0
when p = 0, the condition in Eq. (14) requires the probability weighting function
to be discontinuous at p = 0. The uneven income distribution is better because
increasing the probability of gains from zero results in a positive discontinuous increase
in social welfare due to positive probability weights on the positive gain utility, whereas
decreasing the accompanying losses much less results in a continuous decrease in the
negative loss utility. The exact optimal gains and gain probability depend, however,
on the parameterization. The condition is not very strong. In the original version
of prospect theory in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the authors had this type of
probability weighting function in mind, which reflects that even a small probability is
categorized as a possibility given considerable weight.
The left-hand side of the condition in Eq. (15) reminds of Eq. (11). It is the degree
of overweighting of small probabilities of large gains multiplied by the inverse of
the degree of underweighting of large probabilities of small losses. As discussed
in connection to Proposition 2, this factor is greater than one. The right hand side of
Eq. (15) is the quotient between the marginal disutility of losses and the marginal utility
of gains around the reference income. Hence, the condition requires the departure from
linear probability weights to be larger than the degree of loss aversion.
Thus far, we have dealt with two-level income distributions. Real income distri-
butions, however, certainly allow for and often have more income levels. Can the
results be extended to such income distributions? The optimization problem increases
in dimensionality by twice the additional number of income levels, increasing the diffi-
culty of obtaining analytical solutions. Nevertheless, the shapes of the prospect theory
utility and probability weighting functions still have similar impacts. A three-level
income distribution can be created from a two-level income distribution by applying a
mean-preserving spread on one of the income levels in a two-level income distribution.
In Proposition 5, I claim that such a spread can increase social welfare when the mean
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income is the reference income. The argument in Proposition 5 can be iterated to show
that much more complicated multi-income level distributions can be preferred to the
optimal three-level income distribution. The results depend, however, crucially on the
parameterization.
Proposition 5 When using prospect theory utility and probability weighting functions
with the mean income as the reference income, three-level income distributions can
be preferred to two-level income distributions.
As already discussed, a crucial component of prospect theory is the selection of a
reference point. We have so far taken this reference point to be the mean income or used
representative aggregation of reference incomes. Another option is the median income.
Unlike the mean, the median can change discontinuously when altering the income
distribution continuously. The preference for an income distribution increases when
the reference income decreases, leaving room for manipulation of the reference point.
A systematic way to increase the preference for an income distribution is presented in
Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 When the median income is used as the reference income, decreasing
the income levels in the lower end of the income distribution including the median
income is desirable if it decreases the distance between the median income and every
lower income level.
Note that if we decrease the income levels according to Proposition 6, keeping the
mean income fixed, the decrease in income at low income levels provides income that
can be redistributed to individuals at high income levels, which additionally increases
the preference for the income distribution.
5 Numerical results
The analytical complexity involved in obtaining results when combining prospect
theory utility and probability weighting functions can be avoided by using numerical
methods. Multi-level income distributions can also easily be investigated numerically.
Furthermore, we can quantify the welfare effects. On the down side, some results are
driven by the parameterization.
When reporting the social welfare of an income distribution, I report certainty
equivalents rather than social welfare. The certainty equivalent is the additional per-
cent of income that the individuals need when each of them have the mean income
to reach the social welfare of an income distribution. In constructing the certainty
equivalent of social welfare, I use the expected utility social welfare formula to enable
straightforward comparison of certainty equivalents independent of which theory is
used to calculate social welfare. The numerical exercises are performed using 1,000
individuals spaced at income levels with the same probability density mass between
them. At this coarseness, the results are insensitive, but computational time is very
sensitive, to varying coarseness.
The certainty equivalents of different two-level superstar distributions are reported
in Table 1. I vary the size of income gains relative to the mean income in percent
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Table 1 Certainty equivalents of some two-level superstar distributions
Gains Gain probability EU PT mean PT representative
0.5 1 −0.000006 0.05 0.26
5 1 −0.0006 0.54 2.55
50 1 −0.05 4.91 24.36
5 0.1 −0.00006 0.41 1.61
5 1 −0.0006 0.54 2.55
5 10 −0.007 0.35 3.31
Gain probability is expressed in percent and other numbers are expressed in percent of the mean income
and the gain probability in percent (keeping the mean income constant in all income
distributions). I report the certainty equivalents in percent of the mean income for
an expected utility (EU) impartial observer, and for prospect theory (PT) impartial
observers when the mean income (mean) is the reference income and when using
representative aggregation of reference incomes (representative).
We observe that the superstar distributions provide negative social welfare for the
expected utility impartial observer. The social welfare loss relative to complete equality
increases with the size of the income gains and the gain probability. However, the
income distributions provide positive social welfare for the prospect theory impartial
observers and are hence preferred to complete equality for them. The social welfare
gain is much larger when using representative aggregation of reference incomes than
when the mean income is the reference income. It increases with the size of the income
gains. It also increases with the gain probability, albeit only up to a gain probability
of 1% when the mean income is the reference income.
The size of the social welfare gains for the prospect theory impartial observers is
large, up to a certainty equivalent of 24.36% of the mean income when using represen-
tative aggregation of reference incomes. The magnitude of the effects is larger for the
prospect theory impartial observers than for the expected utility impartial observer.
This is because the gain probabilities are small and hence carry small weight for the
expected utility impartial observer, whereas the prospect theory impartial observers
overweight those probabilities. The patterns found are in line with Propositions 1, 2,
and 4.
The certainty equivalents of different two-level scapegoat distributions are reported
in Table 2, which is similarly organized as Table 1. The expected utility impartial
observer again prefers income distributions that are the closest to complete equal-
ity. Unlike superstar distributions, social welfare is also negative for prospect theory
impartial observers. The social welfare loss increases with the size of the income
losses and the loss probability. Furthermore, the size of the social welfare losses is
much larger for the prospect theory impartial observers. This reflects the impact of
loss aversion and the overweighting of large losses.
However, as the income losses or loss probability increase, the additional social
welfare loss is less in relative terms for the prospect theory impartial observers than
for the expected utility impartial observer. For instance, increasing the income losses
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Table 2 Certainty equivalents of some two-level scapegoat distributions
Losses Loss probability EU PT mean PT representative
0.5 1 −0.000006 −0.13 −0.13
5 1 −0.0006 −1.30 −1.29
50 1 −0.09 −11.54 −11.38
5 0.1 −0.00006 −0.94 −0.94
5 1 −0.0006 −1.30 −1.29
5 10 −0.007 −1.39 −1.06
Loss probability is expressed in percent and other numbers are expressed in percent of the mean income
Table 3 Certainty equivalents of some symmetric multi-level income distributions
Spread Uniform
EU PT mean PT representative
1 −0.0002 −0.09 −0.10
10 −0.02 −0.89 −0.95
100 −2.18 −7.99 −8.31
Variance Normal
EU PT mean PT representative
1 −0.002 −0.50 −0.53
10 −0.02 −1.55 −1.63
100 −0.25 −4.66 −4.89
Spread is top income minus bottom income in percent of the mean income, variance is the distribution
variance in percent of the mean income, and other numbers are expressed in percent of the mean income
ten times (from, e.g., 5 to 50) increases the certainty equivalent of the social welfare
loss more than 100 times (from −0.0006 to −0.09) for the expected utility impartial
observer, but less than ten times (from around −1.3 to around −11.5) for the prospect
theory impartial observers.
The certainty equivalents of the symmetric uniform and normal multi-level income
distributions are reported in Table 3. We observe that social welfare is negative for both
distributions independent of the theory applied. It also decreases as spread and variance
increase. More inequality is, therefore, in general, also undesirable for the prospect
theory impartial observers. Like for the scapegoat distributions, the social welfare loss
is larger for the prospect theory impartial observers because of loss aversion. The
additional relative negative effect of additional spread on social welfare is, however,
again relatively smaller for the prospect theory impartial observers.
Because of the desirability of two-level superstar distributions, I also investigate
some asymmetric multi-level superstar distributions. The certainty equivalents of some
triangular and log-normal distributions are reported in Table 4. They are all negative
for the triangular distributions. The pattern is very similar to the one of uniform
distributions. A difference is that the social welfare loss is smaller for a triangular
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Table 4 Certainty equivalents of some asymmetric multi-level superstar distributions
Spread Triangular
EU PT mean PT representative
1 −0.0001 −0.02 −0.03
10 −0.01 −0.22 −0.30
100 −1.35 −2.42 −3.02
Variance Log-normal
EU PT mean PT representative
1 −0.01 1.65 1.52
10 −0.09 4.76 4.35
100 −0.77 12.19 11.09
Spread is top income minus bottom income in percent of average income, variance is the distribution
variance in percent of average income, and other numbers are expressed in percent of the mean income
distribution with the same spread. Furthermore, the social welfare loss for the prospect
theory impartial observers relative to that of the expected utility impartial observer is
smaller for the triangular distribution (for a spread of 100 when the mean income is the
reference income, we have the certainty equivalent comparison −2.42 versus −1.35)
than for the uniform distribution (for a spread of 100 when the mean income is the
reference income, we have the certainty equivalent comparison −7.99 versus −2.18).
This is the effect of prospect theory impartial observers liking superstar distributions,
although not enough to make them preferring triangular distributions to complete
equality.
The log-normal distribution is also right-skewed like the triangular distribution.
However, the skewness is greater. This skewness manages to turn social welfare posi-
tive for the prospect theory impartial observers. Using the mean income as the reference
income or representative aggregation of reference incomes has small effects on the
results. Furthermore, social welfare increases as variance increases. The social wel-
fare gains are large with a certainty equivalent of at most 12% of the mean income.
However, they are not as large as in the most preferred two-level superstar distribution
which had a social welfare gain corresponding to a certainty equivalent of 24% of the
mean income (see Table 1).
6 Concluding discussion
Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1975) and Rawls (1971) offered two of the most influential
theories of distributive justice. Both used the popular social contract approach starting
from an original position where the impartial observer does not know her identity in
the society. Under such a veil of ignorance, her choice of income distribution could
be considered the fair distribution. This paper asked how an impartial observer apply-
ing cumulative prospect theory would choose. Applying prospect theory is appealing
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because it better describes behavior under risk than expected utility theory, which
Harsanyi’s impartial observer uses.
I found that the perceived desirability of different income distributions depends
on the parameterization of prospect theory. Two properties of prospect theory work
in the direction of increasing the preference for uneven income distributions: the
overweighting of the relatively largest gains and diminishing sensitivity in losses.
For a reasonably chosen parameterization, prospect theory impartial observers are in
general more inequality averse than an expected utility impartial observer. However,
inequality could be perceived as desirable when it comes to a specific type of income
distribution that is bottom-heavy and right-skewed where few superstars have very
high income and many individuals have low income, such as the log-normal income
distribution.
Another alternative approach to applying prospect theory in the original position
that treats the decision problem in the original position as a descriptive question is
to ask real individuals or groups about what they would prefer or could agree on in
this position. A problem could be that individuals may not fully interpret the original
position the way they are supposed to, that they may not know how they actually
would choose in the original position, or that they may not truthfully reveal how they
would choose (e.g., by instead revealing how they think they should choose). Given
the parsimonious framing of the original position as a pure decision under risk, the
survey approach would also arrive at the pattern predicted by prospect theory.
The lottery interpretation of the original position is a way to capture impartiality
by forcing individuals to put themselves in other individuals’ positions. This paper
spelled out the implications. For proponents of the idea that the procedural justice
in the original position appropriately embodies impartiality and that impartiality is
central for fairness, some types of inequality must be viewed as socially desirable.
Disregarding this conclusion, the optimal inequality results imply that individuals
would voluntarily join lotteries that lead to the optimal-inequality type of distribution
when imposing complete equality.
From the point of view of the welfare foundation, the social desirability of optimal
inequality depends on whether we should give any weight to (dis)satisfaction derived
from social comparisons between individuals in a society. On the one hand, such
satisfaction is not inherent to the practical usefulness of income. On the other hand,
the perception of the resources of others does substantially affect even experienced
well-being.
It is possible to argue that optimal inequality is an unpleasant and unacceptable
result indicating that the original position needs to be modified or rejected. An issue is
what type of risk preferences the impartial observer should have, if any, in the original
position. It could be argued that some risk preferences such as the one implied by
prospect theory are inappropriate in the original position. This line of argument, how-
ever, amounts to rejecting that the original position transforms the normative question
into a descriptive question; it really implies that the difficult normative question (about
the fair income distribution) is replaced by another (equally difficult?) normative ques-
tion (about what risk preferences an impartial observer in the original position should
have). If resorting to this argument, it is possible to argue that expected utility theory
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or some other theory of decision under risk is a better normative theory than prospect
theory and that the best normative theory should be applied in the original position.
Another issue is whether the problem in the original position is one about decision
under risk. Rawls (1971) argues that it is a decision under uncertainty where the impar-
tial observer should disregard the frequencies of different income levels. In comparing
distributions with known frequencies, it seems difficult to argue why they should be
disregarded. Even then, it is unclear which theory of behavior under uncertainty is the
appropriate one, if not a prospect theory for uncertainty. Along this line of reasoning,
it is possible to argue that risk and uncertainty preferences are irrelevant or should
be ignored. But with such a thick veil, it seems hard to say anything about the social
welfare of income distributions.
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Appendix






u′EU(xm + xg) − u′EU
(
xm − pg1 − pg xg
)]
≤ 0 since u′ (x > xm) < u′ (x < xm) .
Hence, increasing spread from xg = 0 decreases expected utility. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2




= w(pg)u′EU(xm + xg)
− pg











xm + 11 − pg xg
)
− pg




xm − pg1 − pg xg
)
.
For pg < p#g < 0.5, where w(p#g) = p#g , subproportionality implies overweight-
ing and w(pg) > pg, which together with subcertainty implies w(1 − pg) <
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1 − pg. The two inequalities imply Eq. (11), which gives dUdxg (xg = 0) > 0 and
x∗g > 0. pg < p#g is a sufficient condition, but not a necessary condition. p∗g < 0.5
is, however, a necessary condition.
(b) We have the following derivative of the objective function in Eq. (9):
dU
dxg
= w(pg) − pg1 − pg w(1 − pg).
The same argument as in (a) leads to Eq. (11) which now implies dUdxg > 0.
We want to increase x∗g until its maximum. Because of the lower bound of x ,




Proof of Proposition 3















= pgu′PT(xm + xg) − pgu′PT
(






> 0, U has an interior minimum in pg, and it must be either
that p∗g → pg or p∗g → 1 − pg. For p∗g → pg, we have u′PT(xm + xg) <
u′PT(xm − axg) with a < 1 because of loss aversion, which implies dUdxg < 0,
giving x∗g = 0 as the optimum. For p∗g → 1− pg, Eq. (12) implies dUdxg (xg = 0) >
0 and x∗g > 0. If dUdxg is strictly decreasing in xg, we want to increase xg up until
dU
dxg = 0, or until its upper bound xg =
pg
1−pg
xm. Equation (13) is sufficient for





xm, pg = 1 − pg
)
> 0 = U (xg = 0).
(b) In (a), there is an x such that u′PT(x > xm) > limz→−∞u′PT(z) implies
limxg→0+u′PT(xm + xg) > limz→−∞u′PT (z) and dUdx > 0. This gives x∗g > 0
when p∗g → 1−. We want to increase xg infinitely, i.e., x∗g = ∞.











x0 − 11 − pg xg
)]
.
We have u′PT (xm + z) < u′PT (xm − z) for all z, because of loss aversion. Hence,
dU
dxg < 0. 	unionsq
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Proof of Proposition 4
(a) In both cases, Eq. (14) implies lim pg→0+UPT(xg > 0, pg) = lim pg→0+w(pg)
uPT(xm + xg) > 0 = UPT(xg = 0).





xm + 11 − pg xg
)
− pg




xm − 11 − pg xg
)
.
Equation (15) implies dUPTdxg (xg = 0) > 0 and hence x∗g > 0. p∗g < 0.5 is needed
for w(pg)pg
1−pg
w(1−pg) > 1, see the proof of Proposition 2a. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 Start out from the optimal two-level income distribution. Can
we improve on it by dividing one of the income levels into two levels using a mean-
preserving spread? Start with the income level below the mean income. Assume the
mean-preserving spread increases income by a small z < pg1−pg xg (so that the new
income levels are still below the mean income) in half the cases and −z in the other half.
Then, the convexity of the prospect theory utility function implies that such a spread
increases social welfare if linear probability weights or prospect theory probability
weights that are close enough to linear probability weights are used. Can the income
level above the mean income be improved by such a spread? Assume the same type
of mean-preserving spread with z < xg. Then, if the probability weighting function
is convex around p, which it may be in prospect theory, the spread increases social
welfare if a linear utility function or a prospect theory utility function that is close
enough to the linear function is used. We have thus established at least two situations
where a three-level income distribution created from a two-level income distribution
can be preferred to the optimal two-level income distribution. 	unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 Obviously, decreasing the distance between the median
income and every lower income levels decreases the loss utility of those lower income
levels. The decrease in the median income also increases the gain utility of the higher
income levels. 	unionsq
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